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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The risk level project (RNNP) has resulted risk level trend methodology which is very useful 
in monitoring the trend of major hazard risk level in Norwegian shelf. However, the method 
cannot be used in installation level. Therefore, there is the need of major hazard risk 
monitoring in single installation. This thesis proposes an approach to address the need. The 
approach need to be simple in calculation, not burden the operator with complex reporting 
scheme but sufficient to provide information for decision making 
In this approach descriptive statistics method is utilized to monitor major hazard indicator. 
Case studies are presented to illustrate application the approach in real practice and the results 
are analyzed trough triangulation method to provide a broad picture of risk.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Risk is a familiar word for everybody and its presence is ubiquitous. The word 
risk itself is neutral, but lay people always perceive it with something bad. Some 
people choose to preoccupy it into their mind and some others don't. Why people 
treat risks in different way? One illustration might help; People, who use to live in 
big city with hectic traffic and careless driver, will behave less panic compare 
with people from small city with solicitous driver when they face careless driver. 
What are the things that make them react differently?  Does their experience make 
the risk lower? Or they become ignorance with the risk?  The risk cannot be lower 
nor they become ignorance, but human race is known by its knowledge, the key 
differences that make us live on the earth and make other species extinct. The 
daily experiences from the people who live in the big city make them have more 
knowledge in dealing with careless driver than people from small city. The 
occurrences of careless driver are more than in big city. As consequence they 
could develop their own knowledge about the hazards and it is reflected in their 
behavior as they are more alert with specific information. They could   judge that 
one situation could lead to accident and the others don't. However, we all prefer 
the solicitous driver than the careless one and the system has to be developed to 
prevent people drive carelessly. The underline of the example is the more frequent 
the accident the more knowledge we could learn. 
How about major catastrophe? If it happens very rare and time span is very long. 
How could people learn and develop their knowledge?   Could many small 
accidents indicate the future occurrence major accident? Our intuition will come 
to conclusion that there should be a great possibility the accident will happen. If 
everybody drives carelessly and there have happened a number of accidents then 
we will agree that someday the occurrence of major accident is only a matter of 
time. However, another situation could lead to bafflement. If everybody drive 
carefully and there has been no accident for a long time, could it be perceived that 
the major accident will not happen? Our intuition will come to conclusion that the 
major accident still could happen but it might be with the lower possibility. The 
Baker report (2007) noted when the accidents are occurred frequently, people are 
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aware about the hazard. On the contrary, when the accidents are less frequent, 
people could easily distracted and ignore the hazard.  
 If the catastrophe happens in offshore industry, it will have devastating 
consequence, not only the economic loss but also the lives and environment. A 
major accident of offshore industry in the North Sea was in 1988 when the piper 
alpha platform accidents took 166 lives and caused the insurance loss around £ 1, 
7 billion (Wikipedia).  On April 20th 2010, a major accident happened in Gulf of 
Mexico. A massive explosion occurred in BP Installation the Deepwater Horizon, 
the accident which is also called Macondo blow out killed 11 platform workers 
and injured 17 others (Wikipedia). The oil leak which is estimated around 5000 
barrel/day (Wikipedia) as a consequence of the accident makes the accident worse 
and creates environmental disaster. Until this thesis submitted, the company is 
still struggling to stop the leakage. 
Because the occurrence of   major hazards is extremely rare and the impact is 
huge, therefore we have to monitor the risk level of major hazard. The situation 
arise the question, how could we measure the risk level and monitor the major 
hazard? This chapter gives a brief introduction to historical perspective of risk 
level project in Norwegian petroleum sector and within this context; it outlines the 
research objective of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Historical Perspective 
 
 The Piper Alpha accident has changed the safety system in offshore 
industry at North Sea. Lesson learned from the accident lead to a significant 
improvement in offshore industry safety regulation and operation in United 
Kingdom (UK) authority, as well as in Norway authority, with objective to 
prevent the major accident will not occur again in the future. However, in the 
latter half of the 1990s there was concern from the representatives of unions and 
authorities on the increasing of risk level in offshore operations in Norwegian 
petroleum sector, on the contrary the company management and their 
representatives claimed that “safety had never been better”.  The situation leads to 
mistrust between those two sides and raised the need to provide the information 
about the actual condition and development of risk level in Norwegian petroleum 
self. 
 The authorities, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) at the time, 
now the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), Norway, initiated risk level project to 
3 
 
provide the information to all the stakeholders. The first report was produced in  
2001, Norwegian authority the PSA trough the risk level project produce the risk 
level in the Norwegian petroleum activity  (RNNP) reports based on data for the 
period 1996–2000. The project contributed to a universal understanding of risk 
level development among industries stakeholders.   
 The authorities base their description of the risk development on a number 
of aspects. Experiences from audits, reporting of accidents and near misses, 
investigation of major incidents and R&D activities are important sources. As 
regards the development of major accident risk, the results from the Risk Level 
Project are crucial. Specific areas where the probability of major accidents is the 
greatest have been identified through this project: 
 Hydrocarbon leaks  
 Serious well incidents  
 Damage to load-bearing structures and maritime systems  
 Ships on collision course 
There is an accumulation of technical, operational and organizational factors 
under these areas, and each factor alone or in combination, can cause accident or 
affect a possible series of events. 
During the period 1996 – 2004, these areas contributed more than 80 per cent of 
the total major accident risk on the Norwegian shelf. Helicopter transport also has 
a major accident potential, but does not form part of the major accident indicator 
used in risk levels - Norwegian Shelf (RNNS). The PSA since then make an  effort  
for  continuous improvement in  the risk level development, to identify new 
methods, risks areas and other key parameters which can lead to better 
understanding of which  risk factors are the most important to track over time. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
Major accidents in offshore installation are rare accidents and the time span is 
very long, the time interval between accidents could be 10-15 years. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to find the suitable measurement of the risk level 
related to the major accidents.  Research to find indicators that could be used to 
reflect the risk of major hazard then attract high attention. In Norwegian shelf 
there has been previous study about major hazard  in national level trough “Risk 
level” project in mid 1990s lead by Vinnem and  there also another study  by Øien 
(2001).   
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The PSA risk level project has developed major hazard risk indicators on a 
national level, and the indicators are already used in Norwegian petroleum sector. 
However, the report only describes the risk level on national perspective and does 
not specifically address to single installation perspectives.   This situation creates 
the needs to have indicators that could be used in monitoring the risk level in 
single installations. The indicators for major hazard on national level from PSA 
risk level project could be a useful in defining the indicators and monitoring 
scheme in single installation. However, this condition leads to questions regarding 
those approaches. We formulate the questions for the research objectives in this 
thesis which are:  
• What is the contribution of existing theories and models for monitoring major 
hazard in single installation? 
 
• Which relationship can be established between risk monitoring and major 
hazard in single installation? 
 
The main objective of this research is to develop indicators in single installation 
that can be used to monitor the major hazard in single installation. This involves 
exploring the theories about major hazards indicators and monitoring scheme and 
possibility to contribute to these theories and propose the new approach to 
monitor major hazard risks in single installation. 
 
1.4 Limitation 
 
The PSA risk level project covers   all aspects of Health, Environment and Safety 
(HES). This thesis is focus on major accident risks, as a result all the risks will be 
described  in  major accident context and the others risks aspects are not 
extensively  covered. 
It was widely accepted that the occupational accidents could be used to indicate 
major accidents, but the British Petroleum (BP) Texas City refinery disaster in 
2005 has created a high awareness that occupational accidents could not be used 
to predict major accidents in the future. This leads to questioning the lagging 
indicators and leading indicators in major hazard context.  In this thesis we will 
explore the theories about leading and lagging indicators and frame the indicators 
in major hazard context. This will contribute to the suitability of those indicators 
in major hazard context.  
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The performance of system is influenced by many factors and as a consequence to 
reveal the true risk level of one system, it is not simply about finding the right 
indicators, but also has to be seen beyond the indicators themselves.  It has been 
realized that accidents and errors are not merely a technical issues, one must see 
the risk as a consequence of social interaction between human and their 
environment. Therefore, the risk is about human perception of hazardous events 
then it has to be seen in social sciences perspectives. If we see risk from 
psychometric approach, for most people, risk is not merely a combination of the 
size and the probability of damage, as proposed by the technical-statistical 
approach, but also has a social and subjective dimension (Zinn:2006). In 
conclusion, to describe risk in broad perspectives, we will apply triangulation 
principles in this thesis. It means that the risk level should be viewed in many 
perspectives to give the broad view of risk. The triangulation approach is consists 
of: 
• Triangulation of scientific methods, 
• Triangulation of individual indicators, and 
• Triangulation of the stakeholders’ views. 
Due to the limitation in this thesis we will exclude the stakeholders' views.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
We divide this master thesis into 7 chapters.  Chapter 1 is the introduction of this 
thesis which covers the background, historical perspectives, limitation and 
structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 covers the research methodology in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 covers theoretical background of the research. Thus, provides the reader 
the concepts which are used in this thesis. The reader will be familiarized with the 
risk, major hazard, and risk management in the frame of risk monitoring. Chapter 
4 of this thesis provides literature survey about resilience model, risk monitoring, 
indicators, lagging and leading indicators in the context of risk monitoring 
perspectives as well as lesson learned from risk monitoring application in other 
industries. Chapter 5 provides the new approach, case studies illustration and the 
result of case studies. Chapter 6 provides the discussion and chapter 7 summarizes 
the thesis work in form of conclusion and recommendation for further work. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter describes the methodology which is used in this research. It covers 
the design of the research model, the formulation of research questions, and the 
research strategy followed. 
 
2.1 Research model 
 
The main objective of this research is to develop an approach to monitor the major 
hazard in single installation. To achieve this objective, a research model is 
developed based on a research model, adopting the research model from 
Schönbeck (2007). The research model is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
The research object is major hazard in single installation. This object is studied 
from the risk monitoring perspective, in order to achieve the objective which is to 
monitor the major hazard in single installation. The relevant theories and models 
for a risk monitoring become starting point to form the theoretical background. 
Therefore, firstly the exploration of a number of theories and models for risk 
monitoring is done. Secondly review the possibility of the theories to contribute to 
the major hazard in single installation is reviewed. At last, apply the combination 
of relevant theories and models to the risk monitoring and connecting it to the 
major hazard in single installation. Those steps lead to an approach to monitor the 
major hazard in single installation.   
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Figure 2-1 Research Model 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Research questions  
 
This research model is the cornerstone to formulate the research questions. the 
model then is divided into different parts to be more focus on a research question.  
The first part of the model, shown in Figure 2.2, leads to the first research 
question: 
 
1. What is the contribution of existing theories and models for monitoring 
major hazard in single installation? 
 
The second part of the model, shown in Figure 2.3, leads to the second research 
question: 
 
2. Which relationship can be established between risk monitoring and major 
hazard in single installation? 
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Figure 2-2 Part of the research model leading to research question 1 
 
 
Next step, these research questions are divided into sub questions. The objective is 
to have more focus research questions then indicates what knowledge is required 
to answer those questions. These leads to the following questions and sub 
questions: 
 
1. What is the contribution of existing theories and models for monitoring 
major hazard in single installation? 
 
 What do relevant theories say about the risk monitoring on major 
hazard? 
 Which relevant theories for major hazard? 
 What is the possible contribution of these theories and models to 
the monitoring of major hazard in single installation? 
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Figure 2-3 Part of the research model leading to research question 1 
 
 
 
2. Which relationship can be established between risk monitoring and major 
hazard in single installation? 
 
 What is the major hazard in single installation? 
 Which relationship can be established monitoring major hazard and 
major hazard in single installation? 
 
 
2.3 Research strategy 
 
To answer those research questions, a particular research strategy then must be 
developed and followed. Those contain decisions about the type of research and 
the way to conduct the research. Based on the objective of research and research 
questions, the most suitable approach is a theoretical approach based on scientific 
literature.   This means that the work will consist of comparison of existing 
theories and models then adapted to create something new. The relevant 
literatures are studied particularly from the point of research questions view. The 
result then is applied to develop a new approach for risk monitoring for major 
hazard in single installation. In conclusion, this theoretical research approach is 
more than a literature review. 
 
The sources of scientific literatures for this research are mainly papers from 
established scientific journals (e.g., Reliability Engineering and Safety Science), 
as well as conference proceedings and a number of books. Although it is not a 
comprehensive overview, those sources together contribute all relevant parts of 
the research area,  In addition to the scientific literature, several books about of 
risk analysis (e.g., Aven, 2003; Vinnem, 2007) have provided valuable knowledge 
of understanding risk. 
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3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
This chapter will clarify the terms and explain the supporting theories which are 
used in this report. The readers are familiar to all the terms in this report and I 
believe that they already have intuitive understanding of “risk”, “indicators” and 
“risk monitoring”. However, if they take their understanding for granted, it could 
lead to ambiguity and the view difference could lead this report into different 
perspective. 
A study from F.M Christensen et al. (2003) cogitates that the terminology 
becomes the source of ambiguity and often distract the discussion from the main 
issues.  Following the advice from the researcher, this chapter is aimed at 
clarifying and describing the terminology concepts which are used in this thesis 
such as risk, hazard, major accident, etc. Some definitions are adopted and 
supported in this report as a base of writer view and some others are left undefined 
and should be seen from many aspects. 
 
3.1 What is Risk? 
 
There is no unified definition of “risk”. The word is used in everyday life and 
everybody has their own understanding of the word.  The word “risk” is always 
been associated in negative view by lay people.  However, the experts might 
define risk depend on how they put risk on the context of one particular situation. 
Therefore, we might be better to look some definitions of risks and support the 
definition which is best suit for this report. Definition from Aven (2003) defines 
that a risk is the possibility of a surprisingly bad, or surprisingly good, specified 
future event.  The works from F.M Christensen et al. (2003) discern two 
fundamental understandings of risk, which are:    
1. Combination of probability of consequence/effect on the considered objects; 
severity and extent of consequence/effect under given specified 
circumstances. 
2. Probability of a given consequence/effect of a given severity and extent 
under given specified circumstances. 
 
 All the definitions share the common ideas which are “the probability” and “the 
consequences”. 
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One might need to express risk quantitatively and there are many ways to express 
the risk quantitatively.  The share idea of risk is probability, then this lead to 
question of  “what is the probability ? “ and how do we use it in risk context? 
Probabilities are usually used if we consider an event that there are many possible 
outcomes will occur in the future and we do not know in advance which outcomes 
will occur.  This condition is called stochastic, by contrast, deterministic approach 
determine the outcomes in advance. The probability measures the chance of 
outcome occurs from an event and the value lie in interval [0, 1].   
The value just a number, then what does exactly the probability measure?  A ris 
definition from Aven (2003) explains the relation between events A and their 
outcomes C (Consequences) with uncertainty, therefore risk is defined as 
combination of: 
• Events A, and the consequences C of these events, and 
• The associated uncertainties U about what the outcome will be. 
 
Risk is defined as function of (A, C, U). In this perspective, the observable 
quantities are the focus in expressing the state of event, i.e. quantities of physical 
reality or nature which are unclear at the beginning of analysis but will take some 
value in the future. The uncertainty U about these   observable quantities is the 
main component of risk (Bjornal, 2009).    
Another question pop up from our mind, in this stochastic view, the probability is 
assigned and the value is different from one person to other person. What does the 
thing that makes it difference? One risk definition from OECD (OECD, p: 67) 
defines that risk is a mental construction of mind, therefore someone will view 
risk on one event differently depends on his/her mental model. The mental model 
represents their subjective knowledge of one hazardous event and as a result will 
assign different value.    
In recent news, when the volcano in Iceland erupted and the ash made all the 
flight across the Europe turned into chaos. Many passengers did not understand 
why the plane could not fly for many days; it was not very big eruption which 
thrown massive materials. One might think the safety agency was overprotective, 
but the authorities keep closed the airport and stopped the flight and left the 
passengers wandering.  
Is the different understanding just a matter of perception?  What make the 
perception differ from the lay people and the experts?   Our intuitive will say the 
different lies in the knowledge of lay people and the experts about the object.  It is 
aligned with (A, C, U) perspective. In this perspective,   the uncertainty is 
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understood as lack of knowledge about the occurrence of events A and what  will 
the consequences C  be,  if an activity is carried out or a system is put into 
operation ((Bjornal:2009) adopted from Flage and Aven:2008).  In this approach, 
to express uncertainty the probabilities P is assigned which means from the view 
of the assessor, the possibility of one event occurred is based on his/her 
background knowledge. For example, if the assessor assigns the probability of one 
event occurs P (A|K) = 0.1, the uncertainty is compared to drawing one ball out of 
10 balls in an urn.  Following this reason, in this chapter we will consistently use 
this risk definition from Aven (2003) which define risk as a function of (A, C, U). 
 
3.2 Risk and Hazard 
 
Many people misuse risk and hazard in their daily life. As mentioned above, risk 
explain the relation between an event and consequences of outcomes, therefore 
the term risk has neutral view. By contrast, the hazard has negative view. The 
tendencies of individual to associate risk with bad outcomes make them confuse 
the words in everyday use. 
Some definitions of hazard conclude the negative perspective. Definition from UK 
HSE defines a hazard as something (e.g. an object, a property of a substance, a 
phenomenon or an activity) that can cause adverse effects (UK HSE Website).   
Hazard is also defined as a situation that poses a level of threat to life, health, 
property, or environment (Wikipedia). One definition form Cambridge dictionary 
defines hazard as “something that is dangerous and likely to cause damage 
“(Cambridge: 2008) they share the common idea that hazard is used to describe 
something that has potential to make harmful situation.  
We already agree to define risk as function of (A, C, U). Refer to the risk 
definition, hazard could be seen as an event/ situation A that has possibility to 
cause bad consequences C. Therefore, we can measure the risk of hazard by 
observing the likelihood of bad consequences   of an event.  Quantitatively, 
according to our definition, we could compare the likelihood by probabilities and 
frequency of occurrence of hazardous event. As conclusion, in term of hazard we 
would like support  the risk definition as "Risk is a combination of the likelihood 
of an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or 
ill health that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)" (OHSAS 18001:2007).   
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3.3 Risk Management  
 
Individuals do not like extremely bad outcomes. Recent chaotic air travel in 
Europe which was caused by volcanic ash had created massive losses too many 
individuals. People were stranded and they could not go home on time, business 
meetings were cancelled, football teams had to travel by trains and even the 
impacts reached as far as the tourism resorts in Indonesia. The airlines industries 
around the world had lost more than £1.1bn. People were complaining in the 
television, newspaper and even in the social networking telling that they had to 
spend much more money and time to travel.  One football manager after one 
match said “I am not responsible if the team had to travel by train, I am not the 
man in the volcano”. However, they understood that the situation was 
unavoidable, it was nature. They do not like the massive economic or life losses as 
a consequence of the bad occurrence. 
Behaviour of dislike bad outcomes shows our aversion of risks.  It has been well 
understood that we cannot eliminate the risk. We have to live with the risk side by 
side and hazardous event could happen unnoticed. Therefore, the risk has to be 
managed to avoid the occurrence of hazardous event.  The airport closing was the 
action to avoid the hazardous event occurred in the air travel. However, in safety 
investing context, the reason is not risk aversion attitude, but the willingness to 
protect our assets again uncertainties. This principle is cautionary which means to 
reduce uncertainties against extremely bad occurrence to protect the assets.  
This view  is well expressed by the definition from Aven and Vinnem (2007) 
which define risk management as “ the process of ensuring that adequate 
measures are taken to protect people, the environment and assets from harmful 
consequences of the activities being undertaken, as well as balancing these 
measures with other factors such as costs and earnings “ .  The definition implies 
that we have to measure the hazardous events adequately before we could use the 
result. This process is an iterative process and has purpose as a decision making 
tools. Picture 3-1, which is adapted from ISO 31000 (2007), Aven and Vinnem 
(2007) and the AS/NZS 4360 standard, illustrates the iterative risk management 
process. 
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Figure 3-1 Risk Management Activities (Reproduced from ISO) 
 
The figure describes the process of the risk management activities which consists 
of risk assessment and risk treatment. Risk assessment is a process to identify the 
hazard and threat, cause analysis, consequence analysis and risk description in 
order to provide adequate information for the next step. Following the figure, in 
ISO 31000 (2007) risk assessment is defined as the process of risk analysis and 
risk evaluation, where: 
• A risk analysis is a systematic use of information to identify initiating 
events, causes and consequences of these initiating events, and to express 
risk. 
• A risk evaluation is the process of comparing risk against given risk 
criteria to determine the significance of the risk, and is used to assist the 
decision making process. 
All the processes need to be monitored and reviewed in order to elicit risk from 
the events and ensure the information is useful for decision maker to treat the risk.  
 
15 
 
3.4 Major Hazard  
 
Major accidents is very rare in occurrence but has a massive catastrophe. When 
we talk about major accidents, our mind will think about something which is 
related with natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, floods, 
hurricanes or other acts of God. We also might think manmade disaster, for 
example Chernobyl reactor disaster; Bhopal disasters; World trade centre attack 
and many more events.  Due to media coverage and political benefit of   nuclear 
disaster, lay people associate the manmade disaster with nuclear power accidents. 
Even though, any industries   have potential to experience major accident. People 
who involve in offshore industries will never forget the accident of piper alpha 
which caused massive numbers of lives and economic lost.  
Experience taken from offshore activities has shown that the risks are inherent in 
the industries. The Piper Alpha disaster on British continental shelf in 1988 
demonstrated the scale of major accidents consequences of an offshore installation 
could bear. Although, the last major accident on a facility was in 1986 when the 
shallow gas blowout on the mobile facility West Vanguard, the recent incidents in 
Norwegian shelf installations have indicated the potential in causing major 
accident. 
We, in this thesis will focus on major hazard in offshore installation under 
Norwegian authority. Therefore to limit the understanding of major accident, we 
will use a definition from Norwegian authority which defines a major accident as 
“an acute incident, such as a major discharge/emission or a fire/explosion, which 
immediately or subsequently causes several serious injuries and/or loss of human 
life, serious harm to the environment and/or loss of substantial material assets “. 
(PSA Website). Furthermore, we would like to define a major hazard as a hazard 
which could cause a major accident.  
  
3.5 Risk Analysis in Major Hazards Perspective  
 
In human perspective, a major accident will have large impact on society at large. 
For those who are affected by the accident, the loss will be far larger than what is 
presented in the figures, the value of a life cannot be expressed in money. The 
research from von Winterfeldt et.al (1981) showed that the risks with a low 
probability but high consequences would be perceived as more threatening than 
more probable risks with low or medium consequences. Therefore, major accident 
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risk reduction becomes an important reason for the formulation of existing health, 
safety and environment regulations. Risk analysis, then should be taken 
adequately to identify major hazard and treat it regarding the balance of safety and 
cost. 
The result of risk analysis as mentioned from the work of Apostolakis (2004), will 
never be a single factor to make decisions, but provides a basis for risk-informed 
decisions. Therefore, there is still a need for managerial review and judgment to 
disclose many aspects which could not be captured in risk analysis process 
(Bjornal ,2009 adopted from Eidesen, 2008). 
Risk analysis is also about identifying the occurrence of events in the future, and 
risk analysis by definition above is a systematic use to identify event and 
predicting the occurrence and its consequence in the future.  However, we cannot 
measure accidents or incidents in the future; by contrast we can observe incidents 
and accidents that has happened.  Although we can use the historical events to 
estimate the risk in the future, we cannot simply use them, otherwise the figures 
will barely the extrapolation of historical events.  We therefore should consider 
the uncertainty between the risk estimation and the true risk, Bjornal in his 
dissertation stated that in many approaches to risk analysis for major hazards, the 
purpose is to provide an estimate of an underlying “true” accident probability 
(Bjornal, 2009).  This is meant to reveal the knowledge and lack of knowledge of 
risk analysis. This perspective is in-line with (A, C, U) principle and will be used 
in this thesis. 
 
3.6 Major Hazard Risk Monitoring in Risk Management 
Perspective 
 
Risk analysis is a resource demanding process, however to produce a suitable risk 
information which can serve as a basis to make decisions is a challenging task. As 
many other activities, There are a number of constrains in doing the activity, such 
as workloads; time; skills and many other factors. Risk is dynamic, once risk has 
been identified, another risk will emerge. However, the AS/NZS 4360 emphasises 
that “few risks remain static” (Bjornal:2009) , therefore there is a need for 
continuous activities to monitor the risk. Framing the monitoring purpose in major 
hazard context will rise a question “how can major hazard monitoring support risk 
management process? “  
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Monitor from the Cambridge advanced learner dictionary has meaning as “to 
watch and check a situation carefully for a period of time in order to discover 
something about it”. This is just broad meaning of monitor, but it has important 
message which is the activity must be done in a period of time.  Risk monitoring 
activities then, must be done periodically to provide the information of current 
risk status to the management. In the case of major accidents, simply monitoring 
the risk merely base on accidents occurrence will give no value, since the periodic 
time is very long. Therefore, we have to extent the scope to the precursor of 
accidents. 
Bjornal in his dissertation (2009) stated  that the accidents is not directly 
manageable and the manager needs to see whether the accidents are the result of 
processes and conditions in the organization. Lesson learned from The Baker 
report and Hopkins (2007), noted that before the accidents, there had been a 
number of  fires and several hundred losses of containment. The report, further 
argue that monitoring the incident could have been a valuable input for plant 
safety management. Moreover, (Bjornal (2009) adopted from Reason (2000) )and 
others show that to have an effective safety management, the focus must be on the 
manageable processes and conditions which influence the major hazard risk. 
The picture below which is reproduced from Bjornal dissertation (2009) illustrates 
the accident chain. This picture describes the manageable process and condition 
prior the accidents; activities, barrier performances and occurrence of incidents 
are often occurred before the accidents. 
 
Monitoring these manageable process and view them along with the influencing 
factors such as time constraints, skills, workloads etc could produce a broad 
picture of safety performance of system. Seeing in this perspective, this risk 
 
 
Figure 3-2 A Typical of accident chain adapted from Bjornal (2009) 
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monitoring scheme could be a helpful complement to the risk analysis and other 
decision support tools (Bjornal: 2009). As mentioned above, risk analysis is meant 
to provide information for decision making and risk monitoring activities as a 
complement therefore could only provide the information as well. Uncertainty is 
needed to be placed to judge the outcomes and caution should be used  before 
starting further action for example risk reduction measure when  there is 
uncertainty linked to the consequences (Aven and Vinnem:2007). These minimum 
requirements are important because we should not do an analysis beyond what can 
be justified under the method limitations. 
 
3.7 Safety Barrier 
 
Humans use safety barriers to protect their lives and property against natural 
hazard and/or enemies since the beginning of human existence. Ancient South 
East Asian people lived in the elevated house to protect them against animal and 
flood; Ancient Rome build The Hadrian Wall in North of England to protect them 
against their enemies and as far as in China,   The Chinese Empire made the 
famous man made safety barrier which is The Great Wall of China, a lengthy and 
gigantic wall which meant to protect them against Mongol invasion. As the 
human being entered the industrial age, they develop safety barrier against hazard 
which arose from industrial hazard. It was an interesting fact that, how people has 
developed their understanding between accidents and safety barrier. 
Safety barrier concept has been applied widely and covered many areas, therefore 
the understanding of safety barrier concept are often limited to the objective to the 
industry where the safety barrier is applied.  Sklet (2006) has studied carefully 
about safety barrier concept crosswise the industries and stated that there is no 
common terminology applicable crosswise the industries. Therefore in the context 
of industrial safety,   He bespoke that safety barriers are defined as “physical 
and/or non physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired 
events or accidents”. This definition is not to be confused with barrier system 
which realizes the function. Furthermore, a barrier function is defined as “a 
function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents” 
and barrier system is defined as “a system that has been designed and 
implemented to perform one or more barrier functions “. We in this thesis would 
like to use the definitions above to limit the understanding of safety barrier, 
barrier function and barrier system and use it in the context of offshore industries. 
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3.8 Accidents and Safety Barrier 
 
Following the definition above, the safety barrier has function to prevent, control, 
or mitigates the accidents, but the accident is still occurred. What makes the safety 
barrier fail to perform its function?  Reason(1990), developed  the Swiss cheese 
model  based on  human behavior and organization theory. This model use cheese 
slices to represent the barrier and the holes in each slice represent the weakness of 
barrier system against particular hazard.  
The barrier act like dynamic cheese slices where each slice has holes vary in size 
and location. The accident, then will happen if all the holes in cheese slices  are 
in-line which mean all the vulnerability of safety barriers are exposed  and the 
hazard passes through the holes and create the accident (Figure 3). The holes in 
the system arise from two conditions which are latent failures and active failures. 
Active failures are the failures which come from individuals who have direct 
contact with the accidents. Latent failures are the hidden failures which come 
from the condition which can influence the individual to perform the task or the 
system ability to deal with the situation.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Swiss-Cheese Model (Adapted from Reason :1990) 
 
Bildet kan ikke v ises. Datamaskinen har kanskje ikke nok minne til å åpne bildet, eller bildet kan være skadet. Start datamaskinen på nytt, og åpne deretter filen på nytt. Hvis rød x fortsatt v ises, må du kanskje slette bildet og deretter sette det inn på nytt.
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Within this model, the accident might happen if all the safety barriers at one 
moment, fail to perform their functions and at the same time the operator in the 
frontline who perform the task made an error. The model could explain how the 
safety barrier performance might prevent accident as a good safety barrier will 
have less holes and as a consequence will minimize the occurrence of active 
failure and influence factor.  
The barriers could be weakened and have more holes or bigger holes as a 
consequence of system which constantly changes. As an example, the brake 
system in the car is meant to be as a safety barrier, but the brake might not 
perform as it required if the car maintenance is not good. The deteriorating brake 
represents the growing of cheese hole. Therefore, monitoring the safety barrier 
performance will have an added value for safety management system.  This, could 
provide early warning for the stakeholders if the barriers are weakened  
  
21 
 
4 LITERATURE STUDIES 
 
 
The previous chapter has already provided the reader about the importance of 
monitoring the risk. But, how could we monitor the risk? We therefore need a 
point of reference to tell us that some events or things are hazardous and some 
others are not.  But, monitoring the risk is a challenging task. The reader has been 
informed that the risk monitoring is a dynamical process. Once the hazard has 
been identified and safety barrier has been implemented, the new hazard emerges. 
The process then will make a circular loop until the adequate information has been 
achieved. However, the information will never be enough, one should state that 
their own limitation in connection with budget, time limit, regulation and other 
factors. 
Within this chapter, we will provide the result of our literature studies to the 
reader to describe resilience engineering, lagging and leading indicators, risk 
monitoring methods and activities. We are also interested in learning from other 
industries about monitoring the risks, in order to find the ideas which could be 
useful in connection with major hazard risk monitoring.  
  
4.1 Resilience and Accident Model 
 
4.1.1 Resilience and Swiss­cheese Model 
 
Accepting the accident model is not just has a consequence how we understood 
the accident but how we see other related terminology under the model. We are 
interested in defining the resilience terminology within this thesis.  Resilience is 
important as we are interested in developing the monitoring scheme to attract 
management to be more aware in maintenance activities. 
 Resilience according to the Cambridge dictionary is defined as “able to quickly 
return to a previous good condition”.  However, Hollnagel (2006) defines 
resilience in Swiss-cheese model or complex linear model, resilience is the ability 
to maintain the effective barriers which can resist the impact of harmful agents 
and the degradation which is a result of latent conditions. The definition from 
Honagel is very different from the meaning in dictionary. He argues that Swiss-
chess model is still a linear model which can only explain the chain of accident 
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and cannot explain the resilience of system to return to previous good condition.  
Therefore, the resilience of system under this model depends on the ability of the 
barrier to withstand. The model cannot explain why the holes eventually in-line?  
The activities of sliding the cheese slices to prevent the accident according to him 
can be seen as non-linear activities. 
We, in some extents agree with him to view the accident as a complex non-linear 
system with many factors affecting the occurrence of accident. However the 
Swiss-cheese model explains the occurrence of accident in perspective of safety 
barrier and we find this is still relevant in explaining a specific situation for 
example the causality of accident in offshore industries, particularly in explaining 
the hydrocarbon leaks of technical barrier.   The inability of this model to explain 
the occurrence of holes alignment becomes the limitation of this model.  
 
4.1.2 Technical Barrier System Dynamics Model 
 
The cheese holes vary in place and size. The size can grow and move as a result of 
latent condition and the harmful agents.  Based on the limitation in Swiss-cheese 
model, we would like to propose simple model based on the system dynamics to 
explain the resilience of technical barrier. Following this reason, we, in this thesis 
still define the resilient as its basic meaning according to the dictionary. This 
definition also provides the pro-active perspective in risk monitoring.  
This system dynamics model which is shown in figure 4-1 is only a basic system 
dynamics model; we do not take into account other factor such as delay and is 
intended mainly to show the effect of technical barrier maintenance.   It starts 
from initial technical barrier condition, the lower technical barrier condition, the 
level of risk is increasing and the company has to increase the maintenance 
activities to keep the condition of technical barrier in acceptable level. Hence, the 
system will create a circular loop. The risk monitoring process here which is 
represented in level of risk in installation, serve as the feedback for preventive 
maintenance which controlling the technical barrier to be always stable in high 
availability state. 
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Figure 4-1 Basic Model of Technical barrier and preventive maintenance 
 
4.2 What is Risk Monitoring? 
 
It has been mentioned above that risk management is an iterative process. 
Therefore monitoring process is needed to ensure that the process goes into the 
objective direction not in the opposite direction. There are many definitions of risk 
monitoring. 
In connection with risk management process, the end result of the activity is to 
provide risk information. Following this, we support the definition from Bjornal 
(2009) which defines risk monitoring as an activity that involves reviewing, 
tracking, evaluating and reporting on the status of the risks. Many people 
misunderstood that to set the risk level is barely about finding the set of risk 
indicators. By contrast, Vinnem (2009) stated that there are no single indicators 
that may express all the relevant aspects of health, environment and safety and 
there will always be a need for parallel illustrations by invoking several 
approaches  
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4.3 Learning From Risk Monitoring in Banking Industries 
 
4.3.1 Risk Monitoring Activities 
 
Banking industry is an example of industry which risk monitoring activities has 
already widely applied. Basel accord II provides the international standard for 
banking regulator to create regulations regarding the amount of capital which 
should be allocated to guard the banks against the risk that might arise from 
financial and operational risks. Basel II has three pillars concept – (1) minimum 
capital requirements (addressing risk), (2) supervisory review and (3) market 
discipline. In this thesis, we would like to consider the first pillars, in this pillars 
the capital requirement is meant to address three major components of risk that a 
bank faces which are: credit risk, operational risk and market risk.  
With the objective of measuring risk, the bank develops two kinds of indicators 
which are: Key Risk Indicator (KRI) and Key Performance Indicator (KPI). KRI 
has objective to measure the riskiness of an activity while KPI has purpose to   
measure how well the performance of the system. Those indicators have different 
function, the function of KRI is to measure operational risk, whereas the KPI is to 
measure credit and market risk. While the latter is an indicator of how well 
something is being done, the former is meant to indicate the future harmful impact 
[Wikipedia]. In contrast with credit and market risk which have profit objectives, 
the operational risk has different objective, which is risk reduction.  
The operational risk (Basel:2006) in banking industries context is defined as “the 
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events “. This definition accommodates the 
understanding that minimizing the internal failures could minimize the 
catastrophe. Inevitably, in the long-term, internal failures are often lead to a major 
catastrophe.  
With regards of industrial safety, the focus of measuring operational risk seems 
more suitable to indicate major accident than focusing on system performance. 
The premise is similar with the reason in banking industry, which is managing the 
internal processes, people and system could reduce major accident risk. Therefore, 
developing KRI for monitoring operational risk will be an added value for major 
hazard risk monitoring activities. However, to obtain the total risk picture in one 
installation, we must also take into account the historical performance indicators. 
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4.3.2 Operational risk monitoring 
 
The purposes of risk monitoring activities in banking industries are to monitor and 
predict operational events. They, therefore act as complement of a self-assessment 
process to continually monitor the effectiveness of controls.  Utilize them together 
with escalation criteria, will provide information for management about emerging 
issues. Placing the risk indicators under operational risk management framework, 
the risk indicators serve as one of main tools to support risk assessment and risk 
monitoring.  
Risk indicators are used to monitor activity and control the environmental status 
of a specific business area for particular category of operational risk. Risk 
indicators also maintain the operational risk management process dynamic and the 
risk profiles are always updated. However, as the use of risk indicators becomes 
integrated into a risk management process, indicator levels/measures must have a 
frame of reference, which commonly referred as escalation criteria or trigger 
levels. These levels represent thresholds of an indicator or a tolerance that, when 
passed, require management to step up its actions.  
 
4.4 What is Indicator? 
 
4.4.1 Indicator Definition 
 
There is no unified definition of indicator in safety science, some definitions 
defines indicator under particular business processes or industries. Indicator is 
defined by Øien (2001) as a measurable or operational variable that can be used to 
describe the condition of a broader phenomenon or aspect of reality. Other 
definition from Vinnem (2003) which defines risk indicator as a measurable 
quantity which provides information about risk. 
Learning from risk monitoring activities in banking industries, they use risk 
indicator to provide information for risk monitoring and risk assessment. We 
therefore agree with that and  will support the latter definition and use it in this 
thesis, as we will use it to provide information and  it is also  in line with (A,C,U) 
principles (Bjornal:2009). 
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4.4.2 Indicator Requirements 
 
After defining the indicator, the next challenge is how to create effective 
indicators. The indicators have to be in-line with the objectives. Since one of 
indicator goal is to track the progress of objectives then they must give insight 
into the objective changes, as our goal is to provide risk information, the 
indicators should be consistently in-line with changes in losses suffered and, 
ideally, give insight into the risk of one categories or process relative to another.  
Researching the important point of risk indicators, Kjellén (2000) describes a set 
of requirements for risk indicators to have effective risk monitoring, which are: 
• A risk indicator must be robust against manipulation. 
• The methods for data collection, analysis and presentation must be easily 
understood and acceptable to the involved parties.  
• The information that is presented to the decision maker must be relevant 
and comprehensible to avoid overwhelming the decision makers with data. 
• The risk indicator must be sensitive to changes, allowing for early 
warning by capturing changes in an industrial system that have significant 
effects on risk. 
• There should be a reasonably cost-efficient relationship between 
resources spent on the monitoring system and the benefits of the system. 
Indicators have certain limitations, as we already mentioned, many indicators are 
specific to an individual risk and many of them specific to a certain process or 
business. Therefore, it is a challenging task to design a framework which is 
consistent across risks. Some categories have more difficulties then others, 
resulting challenging environment to create risk indicators.  For example, creating 
risk indicator for human and organizational risk is harder than technical risk 
indicator. 
Another important aspect of indicator is data requirement of indicators. The 
information which we would like to produce is relying on the quality of data and 
correlation between the data and the purpose of indicator. A research from 
Andrew Hale (2009) suggests the relation between indicators data requirement 
and their   purpose which are summarized in table 1. 
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Purpose Indicator data 
Monitoring safety level of a system   Reliable data can show valid trends in 
safety. 
 No need of causally linked to safety 
outcomes, as long as the correlations stay 
high  and the numbers are big enough to 
show trends 
Decision support of action.  Indicators must show the causal links 
which can be proven or at least are 
strongly believed to the catastrophe. 
 Indicators manipulation will result safer 
systems. 
Motivating person to take necessary 
actions 
 Indicators must be seen as being  relevant 
from the person. 
 Indicators are able to be influenced by the 
person. 
 
Table 4-1 Data requirement for indicator purpose 
 
 
4.5 Lagging Indicators 
 
Dyreborg (2009) wrote the importance to make a distinction between lag and lead 
indicators. In the context of risk monitoring, Rasmussen and Svedung (2002) 
suggested that lead and lag indicators must be defined under the proactive 
monitoring strategy. However, the definition of lagging indicator rarely becomes a 
discussion subject among safety science experts as the understanding of the terms 
is obvious. They share the idea that lagging indicator is the indicator which is 
based on historical performance of the system. Therefore, the focus of this 
indicator is measurement of outcomes and occurrences.   
Another perspective differentiates indicator being lagging or leading is by seeing 
them in reference of objectives. Lagging indicator is used to measure the 
achievement of objectives whereas leading indicators is used to track progress of 
the objectives. Nevertheless, all the ideas are the same, lagging indicator must be 
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measured after one system has completed its task. We, in this thesis, will define 
lagging indicators as event based indicators which reflect the performance of 
system in the past.    
 
4.6 Leading Indicator 
 
By contrast of lagging indicator, the definition of leading indicators becomes a 
discussion subject in safety sciences.  The research result from Herrera and 
Hovden summarizes a number of different definitions about leading indicators 
(Herrera & Hovden, 2008) which are: 
•  Type of accident precursors, conditions, events or measures that 
precede an undesirable event and have some value in predicting the 
arrival of an event (Construction Owners Association of Alberta, 2004) 
• A form of active monitoring focused on few control systems (HSE, 
2006) 
• “Activity” indicators that show if the organization is taking actions 
believed to lower risk (OECD, 2003) 
• Indicators that measure variables that are believed to be indicators or 
precursors of safety performance so that safety outcome is achieved 
(Baker,2007). 
 
The first and the latter definition indicate the leading indicator is used to track the 
objective progress while the second and the third indicate leading indicator as a 
sign of future event. Different perspective comes from Ale (2009) which states 
that in connection of leading indicator, no indicator can be leading if the value is 
established by observation over time, moreover the indicator value is the value at 
the time of the indicator was observed.  If we follow this definition, then there will 
be no leading indicators unless the values are real time.  
We therefore are not in a position to support Ale definition. This is not only 
because the result will be no leading indicator, but also since we have placed the 
risk indicator in the risk management process objectives. The objective of risk 
management is to provide information for decision making process. Hence, we 
would like to define leading indicator under pro-active perspective then we 
support a definition which is used in economics which define that leading 
indicator is indicator that changes before the economy changes; this definition is 
also supported in Vinnem paper (2006). 
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Driving a car is a good illustration to illustrate MTO interaction to provide 
lagging, leading indicator in safety context refer to our definition above. One 
event can be seen as lagging or leading indicator depends on the objective of the 
indicator. In one situation, a car with 90 km/hour speed in motorway has been 
forced to brake in order to hide the reindeer which cross the street 50 m ahead. 
Speed and distance is a time variant variable, one might be interested in making it 
as a leading indicator. However, those variables are not suitable in safety context, 
but the brake as a safety barrier is more suitable in this situation. If the brake 
function as it required, then the accident has large probability to be prevented. 
Viewing this situation to create indicators, a number of brake failures which has 
caused accidents could be used as a lagging indicator. As the car in operational 
mode, the likelihood of car having an accident can be judged from the current 
brake status. For that reason, within the context of car safety, current safety barrier 
status is useful in providing information of future accident, therefore satisfies the 
definition of leading indicator.  
 
4.7 Leading vs. Lagging Indicators 
 
We should differentiate risk indicators with performance measures. In banking 
industries, the purpose of risk indicators and the reporting framework is to 
monitor the effectiveness of controls and efficiency. By contrast, performance 
measures are typically more global, historically focused, and tied to a balanced 
scorecard which mainly influences compensation. Understanding them in the 
context of lagging and leading indicator, it is obvious that the former is leading 
indicator and the latter is lagging indicator. 
In context of major accident in installation, the success criteria of indicators are 
having zero major accident. Hence, the idea behind this is to have pro-active 
indicator which could be used to maintain motivation and awareness to prevent 
major accident. The indicators should change before the risk level change.  In 
term of historical major accidents data availability, the lagging indicators can only 
give little information about the installation performance in the past, since the 
accidents are very rare. The availability data of major accident precursor events is 
also very rare. Base on experience of all installations in the Norwegian shelf, the 
occurrence of precursor event in one installation is only around one per year, 
therefore in the term of data availability, the lagging indicators are not suitable to 
predict a major hazard accident. The leading indicators then are more suitable in 
giving signal of major hazard than lagging indicators. However, the challenge is 
to find indicator which has enough amounts of data to show the trend as it 
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required in table 4-1. The motivation of using leading indicators is also showed in 
banking industries which applying leading indicators for operational risk in order 
to predict the downturn of economy and resulting in hinder the economic loss. 
 
4.8 Indicator for Major Hazard in Installation 
 
We have presented the reader why the leading indicators are preferred over 
lagging indicators. Hence, this sub chapter is providing the leading indicators of 
major hazard in Installation. This sub chapter is to answer research question no 2. 
 
4.8.1 Major hazard in Installation 
 
Refer to risk level project, Vinnem (2010) stated that the amount of hydrocarbon 
leaks in installation could be precursors of accidents; this argument is also 
supported by the Baker Report (2007) which mentioned several leaks were 
occurred preceding the Texas BP accident. In Norwegian, the authority makes a 
strict differentiation between the leaks of hydrocarbon below 0, 1 kg/s and over 
0,1 kg/s. Only the latter is considered as precursor of major accident. Hence, the 
idea behind the barrier as leading indicator is based on the ability of barrier to 
prevent hydrocarbon leaks over 0,1 kg/s which can be interpreted as preventing 
the major accident. The main focus of barrier to prevent HC leaks are in the 
following: 
 Barrier function for maintaining process system integrity.  
 Barrier function for preventing ignition 
 Barrier function for reducing cloud and spill size. 
 Barrier function for preventing escalation.  
 Barrier function for preventing facilities. 
 
4.8.2 Barrier as Indicator  
 
The leading indicators have been included in the Risk level project and those 
indicators have been comprehensively discussed by Vinnem (Vinnem et al, 2006). 
Those indicators are: 
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 Indicators based on performance of barriers that are installed in order to 
protect against major hazards. 
 Indicators based on assessment of management aspects of chemical work 
environment exposure. 
 Indicators reflecting quality of operational barrier elements, based on 
questionnaire surveys. 
 
In this thesis, we consider the first indicator and the two latter are not considered 
any further.  
 
Developments of barrier indicators in the RNNP project are based on barrier 
element periodic test. The tests are part of preventive maintenance schemes, the 
barrier element is tested using ‘man made’ activation signals or stimuli (such as 
test gas releases) and are carried out without any coupling to increased risk. 
Because it is part of preventive maintenance, the barrier test result could be 
considered as leading indicator according the definition from Kjellén 
(Vinnem:2010). 
 
  
4.8.3 Suitability of Barrier Test Result as Indicator 
 
Indicators, to be used to monitor safety level and motivate people to take 
necessary action as presented in table 4-1 must have big amount of data, relevant 
and able to be influenced by indicators themselves. Barrier test indicators satisfy 
the first reason by having sufficient data from the testing barrier elements 
(Vinnem: 2010). The barrier elements are seen as being relevant in preventing the 
HC leaks over 0.1 kg/s which is according the regulation is a precursor of major 
accident.  The performances of the barrier elements depend on its maintenance, 
therefore seeing this as an object of maintenance personnel; the barrier is able to 
be influenced by the person. As a result, the variations of data according to barrier 
periodic maintenance will attract people and motivate them to focus on barrier 
preventive maintenance. The data for this thesis is from installations from RNNP 
which collecting data 2008 for the barrier as follow: 
 
 Fire detection 
 Gas detection 
 Emergency shutdown valves on risers/flowlines 
o Closure tests 
o Leak tests 
 Wing and master valves (X-mas tree valves) 
o Closure tests 
o Leak tests 
 Downhole Safety Valves (DHSV) 
 Blowdown Valves (BDV) 
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 Pressure Safety Valves (PSV) 
 Blowout Preventer (BOP) 
 Deluge valves 
 Fire pump start 
 
4.8.4 Risk Monitoring in Single Installation 
 
It has been noted, until now there is no method which specifically address to 
monitor the risk in installation level. The Risk level project for monitoring the 
trend of risk level is not suitable to be used in monitoring risk in installation level, 
since the method is aggregation from all installations in Norwegian shelf.  We 
therefore, would like to propose the new approach to monitor risk in installation 
level. The approach will use barrier testing result as an indicator of major hazard 
in single installation as we have argued in chapter 4.8.3.  The detail of new 
approach will be presented in the next chapter. 
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5 NEW APPROACH 
 
 
This chapter will provide the reader about methodology of new approach of 
risk monitoring in installation, the case study and the result of case study.  The 
motivation of the new approach is based on the premise of monitoring the risk 
to encourage preventive maintenance, to keep the awareness of the 
stakeholders to prevent major accident in single installation. Following the 
literature survey from section 4.4, the manipulation of indicator must show the 
safer system; hence we propose the new approach of monitoring risk level in 
single installation. 
 
5.1 Development of New Approach 
 
The risk in one installation can be quantified by comparing the same risk with 
other installation in the same industries Aven (2003). Following the statement, we 
develop the new approach based on descriptive statistics calculation. The 
descriptive statistics means straightforward presentation of facts. The reason 
behind this is because we try to measure the performance of safety barrier among 
all the installation. This method is similar with comparing performance of football 
strikers in the World Cup. The average goal of striker per game can summarize 
the performance of striker in the competition. However, this method reduces some 
important data into simple summary, for example the average does not 
differentiate between scoring against strong team or weak team. Therefore an 
explanation is required before drawing the conclusion from the data.  
Nevertheless, despite of its limitation the descriptive statistic is still powerful tool 
to measure the performance.   
The assumptions have to be made before we can use the descriptive analysis. In 
this thesis, all the installations are treated the same, disregard the type and age of 
installation. With this assumption, we move to the next step by proposing the 
approach to calculate the performance of barriers. Firstly we define the reference 
or threshold which is used to escalate the information to the management. The risk 
level threshold is the average value from all installations in Norwegian shelf. This 
threshold is chosen since the mean value represent the average risk in this 
industry. Secondly, the standard deviation of installation barrier test result is used, 
the premise is that how deviation measure how far the risk in installation deviate 
from average risk.  All the formulas used in calculation are presented in appendix 
A. The complete algorithm is described in the following: 
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 Calculate the installation barrier test and national average of barrier test. 
 Calculate the deviation of the installation barrier test from national average 
of barrier test. 
 Scoring the deviation according to the list in table 5-1. 
 Calculate the total risk installation using the scoring average.  There are 
two options of calculating the average which are the simple average and 
weighted average. 
 
The idea to perform different average calculation method is based on the reality 
that some leaks are more dangerous than others which correlate with some 
barriers have higher risk than others. This fact is translated into weighting system 
which is assigned to the barrier elements. Those weights are included in 
calculating average to form overall risk score. However, in this thesis we do not 
perform the study to define the weights, because the objective of this thesis is to 
show how this method is applied to monitor risk.  The basis for defining the 
weights will be a subject of discussion. 
 
 
Score Explanation Criteria Scoring 
 
 
A 
Status corresponds to 
the best standard in 
industry 
Value  < National average – 
1.5 SD 
 
 
10
 
 
B 
Status corresponds to 
a level better than 
industry average 
National average –  1.5 SD  
< Value  < National average-
SD 
 
 
8
 
C 
Status corresponds to 
the industry average 
National average  - SD < 
Value  < National average 
 
6
 
 
D 
Status corresponds to 
a level slightly worse 
than industry average 
National average < Value  < 
National average + 0.5 SD 
 
 
4
 
 
 
 
E 
Status corresponds to 
a level considerably 
worse than industry 
average 
National average + 0.5SD < 
Value < National average +  
SD 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
F 
Status corresponds to 
the worst practice in 
industry 
Value  < AVG + SD  
 
0
 
Table 5-1 Risk Scoring Table 
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The risk scoring system in table 5-1 is still subjective; the grading system put big 
difference from C to B. It is barely intended to show that massive effort is needed 
in order to achieve a very good risk reduction.  For the same reason as weighting 
system, this scale is still needed to be explored further. In addition to the first 
reason the nature of the data in this thesis is not suitable to provide a good 
judgment in using percentile.  
 
5.2 Observation from case studies 
 
It must be noted that the case study is an illustrative example and mainly intended 
to show how the method is applied to quantify safety barrier performance, in order 
to monitor the major hazard risk.  As it has been mentioned before, this method 
use the deviation of barrier test results from the national average, to produce the 
risk scoring. The results therefore could be interpreted as warning signal for major 
hazard. In this method we are not interested in using the exact value of the results, 
but we will use them together with risk level trend to give a more meaningful risk 
picture. Nevertheless, the quality of test result data and the volume of data are 
very important to give some variations and attract awareness of stakeholder. There 
are a number of things to discuss from this method which could produce 
uncertainties from the result, limitation and space for manipulation. 
 
5.2.1 Data modeling 
 
The data which is used in this thesis is from two installations; these installations 
represent the new and the old installations.  The premise of this data is to make a 
contrast of those two installations, then highlighting that the more fault of safety 
barrier corresponds to higher risk in installation. Installation A is an old 
installation and produce more faults in safety barrier tests, the data are presented 
in table 5-2. Installation B is the new installation and produce less faults in safety 
barrier tests, thus presented in table 5-3. However, installation B does not have all 
the safety barrier data, therefore to calculate the total risk score, only the available 
data are taken into account in calculation. These data are not intended to be 
incomplete, as they are taken from the real data, however these could give an 
illustration how the data incompleteness could be used as a room for 
manipulation. 
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Year/Category 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Fire detection 1332-4 936-4 292-0 1109-1 1114-1 
Gas detection 1400-4 334-3 414-2 712-12 840-2 
Riser ESDV 3-0 4-2 9-2 8-0 12-1 
     4-0a 6-0a 
     4-0b 6-1b 
W&M isolation valves 74-1 60-0 144-1 136-2 128-8 
     68-0a 46-4a 
     68-2b 82-4b 
DHSV 0-0 106-6 167-9 176-15 151-7 
BDV 0-0 22-0 222-19 71-8 162-17 
PSV 0-0 241-16 288-13 235-6 304-9 
BOP 0-0 0-0 194-0 355-1 368-5 
Deluge 102-0 81-0 57-1 27-1 52-1 
Fire pump start 312-0 232-0 155-0 155-1 156-0 
 
Table 5-2 Barrier tests data of Installation A (Reproduce from 
Vinnem(2010))) 
 
 
Year/Category 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Fire detection 1065-17 1122–12 1091-6 1135-17 1135-1 1140-0 
Gas detection 539-19 543-9 547-5 568-9 569-0 561-1 
Riser ESDV 17-1 17-0 48-5 62-1 248-1 160-0 
     124-0a 80-0a 
     124-1b 80-0b 
BDV 0-0 33-4 103-0 90-0 153-1 111-2 
PSV 0-0 0-0 277-17 472-14 312-6 304-20 
Deluge 58-0 45-0 32-1 48-0 32-0 55-0 
Fire pump start 208-0 208-2 155-0 103-0 104-0 104-0 
a Closure test. 
b Leak test. 
 
Table 5-3 Barrier tests data of Installation B (Reproduce from 
Vinnem(2010))) 
In order to provide standard deviations, we generate the artificial data for other 
installations. Those data are presented in appendix A. Although the data are not 
covered all the installations in Norwegian authority, the data are reasonable 
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enough to illustrate the variation of installation's barrier tests data in Norwegian 
shelf. 
 
5.2.2 Risk Scoring 
 
The risk scoring process gives interesting results as are shown in table 5-4. As it 
was predicted, the installation A which is the old installation has four categories 
fall into unacceptable level of safety risk, whereas the new installation has none. 
Despite of those unacceptable levels, installation A has four categories safety risk 
better than industry average which are: fire detection, gas detection, PSV and fire 
pump start, in comparison the installation B has safety risk better than industry 
average almost in all categories, except in PSV  which has considerably worse 
than industry average. The installation B does not have data for wing and master 
valves and DHSV categories; therefore we cannot compare the results. 
The results show that base on the barrier test result, the installation B has lower 
risk in term of gas leakage. Moreover, since the gas leakage could be used as a 
precursor of major hazard (Vinnem: 2010) then it corresponds to less risk in 
having major hazard. This conclusion seems logical, because the installation B is 
newer installation, then the installation were designed to meet the new safety 
standard. Moreover, the components in installation A have younger age than 
installation B, so that in term of component function degradation, they should 
perform better. However, there is need more evidence to support the second 
conclusion, because the degradation of components function are related with 
maintenance performance in the installation. The low score and the down trend of 
risk level in installation could be a good sign the need of improvement in 
installation maintenance performance. 
There is the difference between the predictions and the result, the PSV in 
installation B has less safety level compare with the PSV in installation A. 
Furthermore, if we look into the raw data, there is no difference in number of 
tests, both have 304 tests but the installation A has only 6 faults whereas 
installation B has 20 faults. These results must be perceived as a warning signal 
for the operator of installation B to do an improvement of PSV safety level as 
safety level risk is considerably worse than the industry average. 
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Category Installation A Installation B 
Fire detection B B 
Gas detection B B 
Riser ESDV F B 
- closure test - - 
- leak test -   
Wing & Master valves F - 
- closure test - - 
- leak test - - 
DHSV E - 
BDV F B 
PSV B E 
Isolation w/BOP E B 
Deluge valve F B 
Fire pump start B B 
 
Table 5-4 Risk score of installations 
 
 
We should note that there are significant differences of barrier test frequencies 
between those two installations. Therefore, we should put uncertainties base on 
the variation of test frequencies among installations. The number of riser ESDV 
tests between those two installations differs significantly. Installation A only has 
12 tests and by contrast installation B has 160 tests.  It is logical that increasing 
the number of tests will create lower unavailability rates. This situation will give 
room for data manipulation and could lead to produce false signal of major 
hazard. Therefore, there must be a standardization of number of tests which are 
acceptable to produce a good data. However, it could vary from one installation to 
another installation due to the differences in safety barrier equipment. 
 
5.2.3 Data Availability 
 
As we use the standard deviation to calculate the risk score, the quality and 
availability of barrier test data in installations is very important. We have 
mentioned above that we use artificial data to calculate the standard deviation and 
national average. Therefore, we generate the artificial data in order to reflect the 
data availability condition in Norwegian authority. Table 5-5 shows the data 
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conditions of each installation. The table presents mean fraction faults of the 
installation. 
 
Category Installation  
A 
Installation 
 B 
Installation  
C
Installation  
D
Installation  
E
Installation  
F
Installation  
G 
Fire 0.000897 0 0.0008952 0.0026809 - 0.0008952 0.0051502
Gas 0.002380 0.001782 0.0038461 0.0058479 - 0.0043668 0.0344827
Riser 
ESDV 
0.083333
33 
0 - - - 0.0051546
4 
- 
- closure 0 0 - - - - - 
- leak 0.166666 0 - - - - 
Wing & 
Master 
valves 
0.06
25 
- 0.0027777
8 
0.0062111
8 
0.04 0.0019230
8 
0.0049261
1 
- closure 0.086956 - - - - - - 
- leak 0.048780 - - - - - - 
DHSV 0.046357 - - 0.0126582 0.0476190 0.0147058 - 
BDV 0.104938 0.018018 0 0.0285714 - 
PSV 0.029605 0.065789 0.0434782 0.0204081 0.0909090 - 
Isolation  0.013586 0 - - - - - 
Deluge 0.019230 0 - 0.0014705 0.0047846 - - 
Fire 0 0 - 0.0026881- - - 
 
Table 5-5 Mean fraction of faults of installations 
 
In case of various type of installation and data dispersion, the closure test and leak 
test of wing and master valves only have data from installation A, although the 
total data are available, if the data is more detail, then we would have better 
analysis. The riser ESDV data shows that test result from installation A dominates 
other installations. The faults in installation A is around 16 times larger than 
installation D whereas installation B has none fault. Because one installation 
dominate the value, then the dispersion curve will bigger and contribute to larger 
standard deviation which might not really reflect the true deviation of all 
installations safety performance.  In this case, the riser ESDV data is  from the 
low number of tests therefore it supports the previous statement to have 
standardization of number. However in other case,  the deluge valve tests the 
number of tests between installation A and B are almost same which are 52 and 55 
whereas the installation D and E, by calculating the mean fraction of faults 
correspond to a value of 1 fault out of 680 and 1 fault out of 209.  We, therefore 
cannot judge the previous statement base on the number of test differences. 
However, if the number of tests is in the same range, the analysis will have a 
judgment. 
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5.2.4 Calculation Method Analysis 
 
We would like to compare the calculation methods. The idea is to simulate which 
method is suitable for calculating average. Table 5-6 shows the results of each 
method. We use three different methods to calculate the average risk. The first 
method is simple average method; in this method each category has same weight. 
The second method is weighted average, in this method we assign different weight 
for each category, the premise is that the difference of hazard magnitude in the 
area. We, therefore examine two different weight systems, this is intended to show 
how the change of weight affect the average risk. The weights in the first method 
are assigning subjectively for simplicity reason, so that the sum total of score after 
weight normalization would be the average risk. The second method uses the 
weights base on Vinnem (2010).  Both weight values are presented in table 1 at 
appendix. 
 
 Simple  Average Weighted Average Weighted Average 2
Category Installation 
A 
Installation 
B 
Installation 
A 
Installation 
B 
Installation 
A 
Installation
B 
Fire detection 8 8 0.8 0.8 0.44 0.44
Gas detection 8 8 0.8 0.8 1.33 1.33
Riser ESDV 0 8 0 1.6 0.00 1.33
- closure test - - - - - - 
- leak test - - - - - - 
Wing & Master 0  0 - 0.00 - 
- closure test - - - - - - 
- leak test - - - - - - 
DHSV 2  0.1 - 0.11 - 
BDV 0 8 0 0.4 0.00 0.89
PSV 8 2 0.4 0.1 0.89 0.22
Isolation 2 8 0.1 0.4 0.11 0.44
Deluge valve 0 8 0 0.8 0.00 0.89
Fire pump start 8 8 0.8 0.8 0.44 0.44
Average 3.6 7.25 3 7.125 3.33 6.75
Average Risk E C E C E C
 
Table 5-6 Comparison of Risk Average 
 
 
The calculation of average risk is straightforward, the average is the sum total of 
category values divide number of categories. In weighted average method, 
because the weights are already normalised, then the total sum of values become 
the average. Since the installation B does not have the complete data, then we 
only include the categories which have value into the calculation, therefore in 
weighted average method, the divisor is the sum of total weights. 
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Following the result from all three methods, the installation A has risk average 
considerably worse than industrial average, whereas the installation B has risk 
average corresponds to the level of industrial average. As shown in the table 5-6, 
there are differences in risk average score among the three methods. Installation 
A, has low value for the categories which has more weight in weighted average 1, 
therefore the result is considerably lower than the value in simple average method. 
Installation B has the same case in weighted average method 2 which gives 
considerably lower score compare with its value in simple average method. 
Observing the result from the average calculation method, the simple average 
method has advantage in term of scoring manipulation, since all weights are the 
same. However, assign all the safety barrier with the same weight do not make 
any sense, as we know that the safety barrier has different consequence in creating 
major accident. On the contrary, it is more reasonable to use weighted average as 
a calculation method due to the nature of difference in safety barrier consequence 
to major hazards.  But, this method has weakness aspect as it is more prone to 
scoring manipulation. 
For the reporting purpose, one could assign the low weight for lower score and 
more weight to the bigger score, then could produce the good result. Moreover, 
people are more attracted in putting more effort to the categories which have more 
weight than others, as it is reasonable to produce improvement report which come 
from indicators that have more weight. Therefore, in addition to standardisation of 
number of tests, there should be also the standardisation of weights in order to 
have the proper risk average score which has benefit to be used as information for 
decision making purpose. Another room for manipulation is the reporting 
mechanism as mentioned in Vinnem (2010). The operator can have different 
number of faults depend on their failure modes. Those faults which would prevent 
a safety critical function would be reported, while the faults which are not related 
with safety critical function such as for an isolation valve to close on demand 
would not be appeared in the report. Thus, Vinnem (2010) suggests the 
verification of failure mode classification. 
The thing to be considered in this method is the capability limit of the method. 
This calculation method are simple and straightforward, the calculation only base 
on test result of safety barrier, without take into account  the structure of safety 
barriers. For that reason, we cannot interpret the differences in safety barrier 
structure. 
 
42 
 
5.2.5 Rolling Average 
 
As we discussed above, analyze the installation risk barely rely on the average 
score data itself is not sufficient. The score only tell the relative of installation's 
risk compare to other installation which cannot tell the future risk. We, therefore 
propose to use the risk scoring method together with Rolling three years average.  
The Rolling average method was adopted first for RNNP project in term of 
lagging indicators. The study from Heidi and Vinnem (2008) shows, that this 
method is applicable for barrier indicators. The reason behind this method is the 
low volume of faults in barrier tests for the installation with reliable system. 
Figure 5-1 and 5-2 show the rolling average for installation A and B respectively. 
The values are not normalised as we are only interested in showing the risk trend.  
The analysis is based on assumption that all the data are valid; despite some years 
do not have data. The missing data in the first year of rolling average then will 
create an illusion of the increasing risk trends; however the purpose of this 
analysis, again, is only as a case illustration, we will omit the phenomenon. 
The case in installation B, BDV and deluge valves categories have risk level 
better than average, but has negative risk trend which means the risk on those 
categories are increasing. These facts could be used to attract management 
awareness, as the improvement should be made in order to maintain the good risk 
level. While The same case also occurs in installation A, the BDV, wing and 
master valve and deluge valve have negative trend level. With the facts that all the 
categories with negative trends do not comply with the industry standard, the 
management then has to make a big improvement to increase the safety level. 
 
The authorities in Norway have stated clearly that only the hydrocarbon leaks 
over than 0, 1 kg/s are considered to have the potential to cause major accidents. 
However, in an installation, the occurrence of major hazard precursor is also very 
rare. Lesson learned from RNNP project, for a company which have a few 
installations on the Norwegian shelf, there are only five precursors were registered 
in 5 years. This condition has created the challenge to have the proper lagging 
indicators.  In the RNNP project, they used data from barrier tests result to form 
lagging indicators. The reason was, the barrier tests result has sufficient volume 
and variety of data, therefore are useful to show the safety performance trend. 
This idea was supported from  the work of Hale (2009) which stated that there is 
no need of causally linked to safety outcomes, as long as the correlations stay high  
and the numbers are big enough to show trend. 
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In term of historical accidents data availability, the lagging indicators can only 
give little information about the installation performance in the past, therefore 
cannot be used as a sign of major hazard accident. The leading indicators then are 
more suitable in giving signal of major hazard than lagging indicators. However, 
as it has been shown in the case study that the use of barrier tests as lagging 
indicators has benefit in giving the information to management. 
 
  
5.3  Barrier Tests as Lagging Indicators 
 
The occurrence of major hazard accident in an installation is very rare and some 
installation has never experienced it. As a consequence, it is impossible to make 
the accident occurrence as lagging indicator. The traditional view of operators 
which focused on occupational accidents as a precursor of major accidents does 
not have a solid base.  There is no strong causal relationship between occupational 
accident and major accident. The Texas refinery accident in 2005 showed that this 
assumption was one of the factors to contribute for the occurrence of the accident 
(Vinnem: 2010).  The focus then shifted to a major hazard precursor such as the  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Rolling Average of Installation A 
 
Fire 
detection
Gas 
detection
Riser 
ESDV
- closure 
test
- leak 
test
Wing & 
Master 
valves
- closure 
test
- leak 
test
DHSV BDV PSV Isolation 
w/BOP
Deluge 
valve
Fire 
pump 
start
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
CategoryFr
ac
tio
n 
of
 fa
ul
t
2004-2006
2005-2007
2006-2008
Figure 5-2 Rolling Average of Installation B 
Fire 
detection
G s 
detection
Ris r 
ESDV
- closure 
test
- le k 
test
Wing & 
Master 
valves
- closure 
test
- leak 
test
DHSV BDV PSV Isolation 
w/BOP
Deluge 
valve
Fire 
pump 
start
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
2004-2006
2005-2007
2006-2008
44 
 
5.4 Barrier Tests as Leading Indicators 
 
Following the definition of leading indicator in previous chapter, we support a 
definition which is used in economics which define that leading indicator is 
indicator that changes before the economy changes; this definition is also 
supported in Vinnem paper (2006).  Therefore, we are in position against the 
definition from Ale (2009) which stated that any indicator which is viewed in 
perspective of time could not be used as leading indicators.  If we follow that 
definition, it has consequences that there will be no leading indicator which could 
be applicable in any industry. The indicators in our perspective are seen as pro-
active indicators which are used to give a signal to management to be more focus 
in maintenance process.   
The hydrocarbon leaks has been perceived as precursor of  major accidents, 
therefore viewing in   pro-active indicator perspective,  any barriers change related 
to prevent hydrocarbon leak could be perceived as sign of change in major hazard. 
Therefore barrier performance can be seen as leading indicators. The important 
requirements which are needed to be leading indicators are significant reporting 
volume and sensitivity to change. As mentioned above, the barrier test has enough 
volume of data which is essential to show some variations in indicators and could 
be a useful way to attract attention and maintain awareness (Vinnem: 2010). 
Another advantage of the barriers test data is that they change periodically 
according to their maintenance periods. Therefore, the overall indicator will be a 
combination of slow change indicators and fast change indicators. This 
mechanism is expected to attract the management to focus on maintenance 
process as the indicators change depend on maintenance schedule. 
From the case study, the results of risk scoring calculation show the relative risk 
in one installation from the national risk.  All the overall calculation method 
shows that the risk level installation A is significantly below the industrial average 
risk level which could be perceived to be  more prone to major accident, whereas 
the installation B has the same risk level as industrial average’s. The result could 
be used to tell the installation an operator to increase their risk level with focus on 
individual indicators which has score below C. In installation B, the result could 
tell the operator that the installation has same risk to major accident as other 
installation, but there is need safety improvement for safety barrier which has 
score below C. 
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Following the result from case study, the overall risk score indicate the current 
risk level of installation, the score then will be updated frequently according to the 
test period of the barrier tests. Therefore, the installation will always have the 
current risk level, as the maintenance of fast indicators are normally less than six 
months. This scheme force the operator to have continuous monitoring in order to 
keep the installation has the recent status.  In conclusion, the overall risk score 
then is more suitable to be used to anticipate the major accidents in the future than 
the historical performance as it always tell the current risk level of installation.  
These indicators could serve as a basis for installation KRI, allowing more 
categories to be added into the overall score. 
 
5.5 Premises for Successful Use 
 
This method base on the idea that the bigger deviation of  one installation's safety 
barrier than the national average, correlates with the bigger risk level of  major 
hazard relative to industrial average. The case studies show that the volume and 
variety of barrier tests data are sufficient to provide lagging and leading indicators 
to the operators. The leading indicators could become KRI and lagging indicators 
become KPI.   
The risk score calculation method should be use together with the risk level trend. 
The calculation method which only refers to national average can only tell the risk 
level relative to other installation. The risk level will move according to the 
national average change. This has a positive side, which motivate the installation 
operator to be better than other operator, and it is expected will pull the trend to be 
positive. On the contrary, if the industrial average becomes worse than the method 
cannot provide the information. 
To counteract the weakness side, the risk level trend can give the performance 
trend of an installation. As it has been shown in case study, if the overall risk 
score look good, but the performance trend is decreasing then the operator have to 
be aware. Another purpose of using both results in the same time is to motivate 
the operators to achieve better score every year. One installation test results could 
look worse, if the barrier test results are constant and national average is decrease 
and as a consequence will lead to bigger deviation. This condition is expected to 
be a pressing environment to motivate the operators to perform better every year. 
The overall risk score of leading indicators currently are produced from ten single 
indicators. This is due to in RNNP, only those ten indicators were included in 
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calculating the risk level. However, as these indicators could serve as a basis for 
KRI, more indicators should be added later to provide broader risk picture in 
installation. 
There are two companies which covers more than 80 % installation in Norwegian 
sector, have more extensive lists of the indicators and reporting schemes for 
barrier indicators.  The other companies only have simple scheme which include a 
limited extend of system and not in continuous monitoring mode. As there are 10 
companies which have production operation in Norwegian sectors, the adoption of 
barrier indicators in industry is still low. Therefore, there should be a regulation to 
follow-up of barrier indicators, and it is expected that more companies will adopt 
similar schemes in the future. 
 
5.6 Future Development of the Approach 
 
The case studies, involving variety of barrier test data have shown a promising 
result. The data are sufficient to provide information for operator in form of 
lagging and leading indicators. The method is straight forward, simple and will 
not burden the operator with complex reporting schemes.  Yet, the method is still 
helpful and sensitive to change. However, there are limitations and the need to 
cover uncertainties from the data which are described above which could lead to 
future research to improve this method. 
Until now, the operators more focus in technical aspect of installation. However, 
in reality human and organizational factor is very important to cause major 
accident. There have been some effort to establish indicators for operational 
barriers, but there are few success stories. The challenge of this work, mainly 
because there is no clear and easy ways to measure these levels. The method is 
also labor intensive, which requires audit scheme which may consist of 
observation, questionnaire, and interview scheme of company operation. These 
will require time and from the experience, the interval between two audits 
schemes could take years, therefore those indicators will become slow change 
indicators and as a result could not be good indicators. However, the needs of 
human and organizational indicators are eminent to provide broad picture of 
operational risk in installations. This will be a good candidate for further research. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to find new approach to monitor the risk of major 
hazard in single installation.  In previous chapter, the readers are already 
familiarized with the proposed method. In real practice, the company has to 
balance the operational condition between safety and production. Therefore the 
method should be able to address the safety issue on major hazard and at the same 
time not to burden the company with cost and time consuming calculation. The 
method is simple and not likely will burden the company, then, the only question 
left is “is the method able to address the safety issue on major hazard?” This 
chapter provides the discussions which are important in addressing the issue. 
 
6.1  Can the approach prevent major accidents from occurring? 
 
The premise of the approach is to encourage the barrier preventive maintenance. 
Based in the model presented in figure 4-1, monitoring scheme has function as a 
feedback control to maintain the barrier works at best level. The case studies 
result shows that the risk level of one installation depends on average risk level of 
all installations which means the risk level is always in dynamic state. If all 
installation performs better then automatically the threshold of risk level is higher, 
As a result, the installation which does not perform well will find its risk level 
lower. 
 
The situation presses the management to focus on maintenance activities of the 
installation technical barrier to maintain the level of installation risk. As the 
barriers are very important to prevent HC leaks, then the good state of barrier 
performance implies lower risk of major accident. Lesson learned from the latest 
major accident, the Macondo blow out has showed that the accident was caused 
by the failure of barrier system. At the time of accident, BOP system which is the 
barrier system failed to cut off the oil flow as it required (Wikipedia).  
 
Another lesson learned from Piper Alpha explosion also showed how important 
the barrier system, not only the technical side but also the human and 
organizational barrier. The accident was resulted from a series of barriers failure. 
Firstly, the failure of organizational barrier resulted in the lost of work permit and 
paralyzed the water pump. Secondly, the technical barriers failure contributed to 
the explosion and ruptured the platform. The messages from those accidents are 
obvious, the performance of barrier is ultimately important to prevent major 
accident. Hence monitoring the performance of the barriers to motivate 
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maintenance of safety barriers to be at their best state will minimize the 
occurrence of major accident. 
 
This approach itself has not been tested in real practice yet, and the 
implementation of the approach is only illustrated in case studies. Therefore, the 
validity of the approach is still need to be explored. However, the approach is 
based on the method which has been implemented in Risk level project, and the 
data which is used to illustrate case studies are taken from installation which 
operates in Norwegian shelf. This, at some extend could provide a judgment to be 
applied in real practice. 
 
 
6.2 What should be acceptance limits for high reliability barrier 
elements when testing on an installation? 
 
As the barrier system now become more complex, implementation of barrier 
system in installation required certain Safety Integrity Level (SIL) which is 
regulated in international standard IEC 61508. The SIL is based on FMEA studies 
combined with risk acceptance criteria to achieve the required SIL. Table 6-1 
shows probability of failure on demand (PFD) and the probability of a dangerous 
failure per hour (PFH) corresponding to the safety integrity levels. As the barrier 
in operational mode, the operational SIL is lower than the design SIL. This is due 
to the influence of human and organizational factor to operational condition of 
barrier. According to Schönbeck (2007), the design SIL can only be achieved if 
the barrier operates according to the ideal condition as its design. Furthermore, 
Schönbeck (2007) quoting from Duijm & Goossens (2006), wrote that reliability 
of technical system cannot be improved by safety management system; by 
contrast reliability of system can worse as a result of bad management system. 
This statement implies that the maximum operational SIL is the design SIL. 
 
 
SIL PFD  PFH 
4 10−5 to < 10−4  10−9 to < 10−8 
3 10−4 to < 10−3   10−8 to < 10−7 
2 10−3 to < 10−2  10−7 to < 10−6 
1 10−2 to < 10−1  10−6 to < 10−5 
 
Table 6-1 SIL Table 
 
This monitoring approach does not specifically address the SIL issue as 
performance measure of barrier element reliability.  However, the risk scoring 
method which categorizes the major hazard risk according to the barrier deviation 
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performance could indicate the relative barrier reliability of one installation to 
other installation. This is based on the assumption that the installation was 
designed according to the regulation which resulting certain SIL has been 
achieved. This fact implies that indirectly, the scoring system could roughly 
represent the operational SIL of barrier elements as the barrier test performance is 
measured in operational mode.  
 
As it has been mentioned, the categorization of risk scoring is only for illustration 
purpose; therefore, there are still some further steps needed to find the relation 
between SIL and risk score.  Firstly, this method itself still needs further research 
to find the right value to categorize risk level. Secondly, extend the research to 
find the relation between the SIL and scoring level. However, since in this 
method, the categorization depends on the average of all installation, finding the 
correlation between exact SIL as it shown in the table 6-1 and risk score as it 
shown in table 5-1 could be a challenging task. The possible solution, therefore is 
applying the similar calculation method as described in chapter 4 to score the 
installation operational SIL and corresponding it with the risk level. In conclusion, 
based on some senses, if we disregard the SIL issue, the high reliability barrier in 
this method is achieved if the score is more or equal then C which means the risk 
level is better or same with the industry average. 
 
 
  
6.3 Why focus on technical barriers when human errors are the 
main cause of accidents? 
 
In reality, human and organizational (MTO) factors have influenced the barrier 
performance. They started from the beginning of the barrier project and will 
continue to influence along with barrier lifecycle. This calculation method, 
because it barely focuses on the barrier test result, does not take into account those 
influence. However, as the barrier test is part of preventive maintenance process, 
the MTO barrier has already been included.  The barrier such as standard 
operating procedures, manual and regulation of maintenance process already serve 
as barriers in the barrier testing process. In addition, the regulation requirement of 
high reliability barrier equipment also may have reduced the human error. 
Therefore, some MTO influence indirectly might have been measured in the test 
result.  
 
Following Duijm statement in sub-chapter 6.2, that safety management system 
cannot improve the reliability, this statement is parallel with the maximum barrier 
performance can only be achieved when the MTO is maximum which is as it 
required in the design. Therefore, if we formulate it in the mathematical form, the 
performance of technical barrier can be explained as: 
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Operational barrier performance = α x Design barrier performance   (6-1) 
 
α= MTO influence , 0<α<1 
 
 
From the formula above, it can be concluded that to increase the positive 
influence of MTO, the technical barrier must be kept in perfect condition. The 
Macondo and Piper alpha accidents show that inadequate technical barrier such as 
BOP and safety valve were consequences of inadequate organizational barrier. 
 
Other reason to focus in technical barrier is the availability of data; the data is 
relatively robust against manipulation, and easier to be gathered, in comparison 
with MTO barrier data. The main sources of MTO barrier data is from audit 
activities. As it has been known, the audit activities require time and massive 
effort and in some extent depend on the willingness of people to provide the data. 
This situation leads to the need of well train auditors to assure the reliability of 
data (Guldenmund et.al: 2005).  However those facts cannot be a judgment to not 
include the MTO barriers into the calculation method. Further research in human 
and organizational barrier is necessary in order to have a complete KRI for 
operational risk.  The technical barriers indicators then become the first step to 
build operational risk KRI in single installation and the next step will be the MTO 
barriers. 
 
 
6.4 How to choose what barrier elements are most important to 
monitor? 
 
In this approach, we have presented the readers with the idea that each barrier 
element has different degree in causing major accident. This is translated by 
introducing weight for each barrier element to be included in calculating average.  
As presented in case studies, the weighting system is prone to manipulation. 
Therefore, the proper weight must be assigned to hinder the manipulation. 
Moreover, the ultimate benefit of weighting system is to help management to 
monitor the most important safety barrier. 
  
In this thesis, the weight has not been researched yet.  However, the possible 
solution is using the bow-tie diagram to identify the influence of safety barrier to 
major accident. In the recent years, bow-tie diagram becomes a popular tool to 
illustrate the influence of safety barrier to the accident. Using bow-tie diagram, 
different major accident scenario can be modeled. The prevention barriers which 
act to prevent the cause is placed in the left side and mitigation barriers side which 
act to mitigate the consequence of accident are placed in the right side. One 
success story of using that diagram is the ARAMIS project 
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Figure 6-1 General Scheme of Bow-tie diagram of major accident  
(Adapted from Dianous & Fi´evez:2005) 
 
Following the bow-tie diagram, it makes some senses that prevention the cause of major 
accident is preferred than mitigate the accident as it is in-line with zero accident 
philosophy. Once again, lesson learned from major accident, as the mitigation barrier is a 
barrier after the occurrence of accident such as in Piper Alpha, it might be too late to 
prevent the major accident. In conclusion, the more weight should be addressed in 
prevention barrier compare to mitigation barrier. Therefore BOP should have more 
weight than deluge system. Expert judgment and quantitative risk analysis (QRA) studies 
can serve as a basis to do further research in defining weight. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
What we really are looking for in this study is to create an approach to monitor 
major hazard risk in single installation. This chapter concludes the work in this 
thesis. Illustration from the case studies shows a promising result. Barrier test 
results as the raw data are suitable to be used as indicators. The risk monitoring 
method which use descriptive statistic is straight forward, simple and is likely will 
not burden the operator with complex reporting schemes.  However, in analysis 
explanation is needed to give more meaning from the result.  
 
Following the discussion, this approach might be able to prevent major accident 
by motivating management to maintain the safety barriers to be always at their 
best state. As a consequence, the occurrence of major accident will be minimized. 
However, providing the SIL as a measure of safety barrier reliability state is a 
limitation of this approach. Therefore, the high reliability barrier in this method is 
achieved if the score is more or equal then C which means the risk level is better 
or same with the industry average. 
 
As the MTO influence is very important for performance of safety barrier, the 
need to do further research in MTO barriers is eminent. Although in this approach 
the MTO influence might have reflected, there is no specific method to address 
this issue. Therefore, the analysis cannot be applied under the issue. However, 
focuses on technical barrier indirectly require the management to focus also on 
MTO barriers. Another important issue is the weighting system, as it creates the 
room for report manipulation but on the other side has benefit to management to 
prioritize of barrier monitoring. Following the issue, the bow-tie diagram can be a 
helpful method to address this issue. Based on the method, it makes some senses 
that prevention the cause of major accident is preferred than mitigate the accident 
as it is in-line with zero accident philosophy. Therefore, the more weight should 
be addressed in prevention barrier compare to mitigation barrier. However, to 
have the proper weighting system, further research is a necessity. 
 
Nevertheless, to end the conclusion, this approach is useful to monitor major 
hazard risk in single installation. The data availability, the method is light, yet still 
provides relevant information for management to make a decision. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Formula 1. Average 
 
 
 
Formula 2. Weighted Average 
 
 
 
Formula 3 Standard Deviation 
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Category Weight 1 Weight 2 
Fire detection 0.1 0.06 
Gas detection 0.1 0.17 
Riser ESDV 0.2 0.17 
- closure test   0.00 
- leak test   0.00 
Wing & Master 
valves 0.2 0.11 
- closure test 
  0.00 
- leak test   0.00 
DHSV 0.05 0.06 
BDV 0.05 0.11 
PSV 0.05 0.11 
Isolation w/BOP 
0.05 0.06 
Deluge valve 0.1 0.11 
Fire pump start 
0.1 0.06 
 
Table 1 Category Weight (Normalization) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
55 
 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
BDV   Blowdown Valves  
BOP  Blowout Preventer  
BP   British Petroleum  
DHSV  Downhole Safety Valves 
ESDV   Emergency Shut Down Valve 
HES    Health, Environment and Safety  
KPI   Key Performance Indicator 
KRI    Key Risk Indicator 
MTO   Humans, Technology and organization 
NPD   Norwegian Petroleum Directorate  
PSA   Petroleum Safety Authority  
PSV    Pressure Safety Valves  
QRA   Qualitative Risk Analysis 
RNNP   Risk level in the Norwegian petroleum activity  
RNNS   Risk levels - Norwegian Shelf   
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